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STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Respondant, 
vs. 
WILLIAM L. FLOREZ 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 870003 
No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Evidence of defendant's prior criminal record was imper-
missibly admitted into evidence, contrary to Rules 403, 404 
405 and 609 of Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The State is also prohibited from presenting evidence of 
the defendant's prior criminal record by the Sixth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution and by Article 1, Section 12 
of the Utah Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The defendant, William Louis Florez, was charged by the 
State of Utah with the commission of a capital homicide, murder 
in the first degree. Pursuant to §76-5-202 Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended) the State charged the defendant with a capital 
homicide under two theories; I. that the murder occurred during 
an aggravated burglary or burglary and; II. that the defendant 
had been previously convicted of a felony involving a crime of 
violence. (R at 1) The State moved to admit defendant's past 
record during their Case in Chief under the theory that it was 
necessary to prove elements of the offense of Captial Homicide; 
or in the alternative, for the purpose of impeachment. A pre-
trial hearing was held on this Motion in Limine on November 26, 
1986, and during that hearing the defense attorney proposed to 
The State would not be allowed to bring in evidence of 
defendant's prior convictions either in Its Case in Chief 
or for the purpose of impeachment unless the defense 
"opened the door" and further that the defendant would 
stipulate that if the jury were to come back with a finding 
of intentional or knowing murder, not occurring under a 
period of extreme emotional distress, then the defendant 
would stipulate that the offense would be a Capital 
homicide and the case could then go to the jury for the 
sentencing phase. (R at 551-552, 554) Also, during 
this hearing on the Motion in Limine, defense counsel 
objected to the constitutionality of the capital homicide 
statute in so far as the evidence of past crimes of viol-
ence brought the killing under the capital portion of 
the statue. (R at 552,572) After a lengthly discussion 
during this hearing, the Court ruled that the prosecution 
would not be allowed to bring up the defendant's prior 
criminal history in Its Case in Chief, assuming the the 
defense proposed an acceptable stipulation. The Court 
further ruled that the State could, for purpose of im-
peachment, inquire into the defendant's record if he 
were to get on the witness stand. (R at 569,574) 
The trial in this case commenced on December 1, 1986, and 
prior to the calling of the jurors, defense counsel entered 
the proposed stipulation into the record. ( R at 601-603) 
(R at 117-119) 
At the beginning of the second day of trial, December 2, 
1986, the Court informed counsel that it had reversed its prior 
ruling and that the Court was going to allow into the record, 
the defendant's prior three convictions of aggravated assaults, 
during the State's Case in Chief. (R at 608) The Court further 
ruled that the State would be allowed to enter in evidence as 
an Exhibit, the three conviction and commitment to prison orders 
or the prior convictions of the defendant. (R at 620) Defense 
counsel immediately objected claiming that these documents went 
beyond the scope of the capital homicide statue and beyond the 
scope of the Utah Rules of Evidence regarding impeachment, in 
that they described a commitment to the Utah State Prison. The 
Court overruled defense counsels objection and allowed the 
introduction of the commitment orders, together with the oral 
statements that the defendant had been previously committed to 
the Utah State Prison on three occasions. (R at 620) Further-
more, the Court ruled that the State could raise the commit-
ment evidence in their Case in Chief prior to the defense 
raising any kind of defense. (R at 621) 
The State began its case with an opening statement given by 
Mr. Hughes and during that opening statement Mr. Hughes stated: 
"The other items is that Mr. Florez has previously been 
convicted of violent crimes. He's been convicted on 
three occasions of violent aggravated assault and the 
aggravated assault was committed in 1977 in Davis County 
for which he was convicted for a Third Degree Felony, 
he was again convicted in Weber County of aggravated 
assault, a Third Degree Felony in 1980, he was convicted 
again of a Third Degree Felony, aggravated assault in 
Salt Lake County in~1981 ." 
(R at 628-629) 
During the State's Case in Chief the State called Oohn 
Carter to testify. Oohn Carter was the defendant's probation 
officer and Mr. Carter testified that the defendant had been 
previously convicted of three aggravated assault convictions 
and that he was committed to the Utah State Prison on all 
three convictions. Furthermore, through Oohn Carter, the 
State introduced, over defense counsels objection, Exhibits 
8, 9 and 10, which were the commitment orders on the three 
aggravated assaults. (R at 702-703) 
During the defense's case, defense counsel called Steve 
Watson as an expert witness. During the cross examination of 
Steve Watson, the State again brought up the fact that the 
defendant had been convicted and committed to prison on three 
prior occasions. (R at 214) 
The defendant took the stand in his own defense and defense 
counsel was careful not to open the door concerning the 
specific's of the defendant's three prior aggravated assault 
convictions. However, on cross examination the State got into 
the specific instances as follows: 
Q. What if you had waited a week or two? Would it then 
have been okay? 
A. I wouldn't say it would be okay. 
Q. You weren't ever going to let her go were you? 
A. I let her go, I let my ex-wife go, I let other girl 
friends go. 
Q. You let other girl friends go? Let's be clsar about 
that Billy. 
A. Ya. 
Q. Patricia Lavador, you let Patricia go? 
A. I don't understand what you mean by that. 
Q. You let Patricia Lavador out of your life I'm asking. 
A. She's out of my life now. 
Q. You let Patricia Lavador out of your life and let her 
A. Not when we was together, no. 
Q. You didn't let her go? 
A. Not when we was together , no. 
Q. The only way she got out was taking affirmative action, 
going to the cops wasn't it? 
A. Yes. 






Dana Montes, was the same situation? 
It wasn't the same situation. 
(R at 440-441 ) 
Defense counsel did not object at that point on the fact that 
a prior objection had been overruled in Dudge Wahlquist's 
chambers' and defense counsel did not want to bring this inter-
change to the attention of the jury. (R at 443-444) Prior to 
the closing statement, defense counsel made yet another motion, 
that being that during their closing argument, the State not 
be allowedto bring up the defendant's past record, and more 
specifically, instances surrounding his past record. That 
Motion was denied and the Court ruled that the State could 
argue it. (R at 470-472) During the State's closing state-
ment, the State again brought up the fact that the defendant 
had been in prison and again mentioned the fact that defendant's 
past record shows a propensity to commit this type of offense. 
(R at 479) Again, in the rebuttal portion of the State's 
closing statement, the State brings up specific instances of 
the defendant's prior record as follows: 
5 
"I mean were talking about serious knifing. When I 
ask him about prior knowledge of his knifing, it's no 
more than all of us know until I remind him of Patricia 
Lavador and all of a sudden it seems to come back. I 
about knives." 
(R at 524) 
The defendant was subsequently convicted of Capital 
Homicide, murder in the First Degree and was sentenced to 
life in prison for that offense. (R at 166-167) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant contents that the trial Court erred in allowing 
into evidence the defendant's prior criminal record. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE SPECIFICALLY, RULE 403,404, 
405 and 609 PROHIBIT THE ADMISSION OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR 
CRIMINAL RECORD INTO EVIDENCE IN THE STATE'S CASE 
The Utah Rules of Evidence set strict and definite para-
meters concerning evidence that tends to show the bad character 
of a criminal defendant. Specifically, Rule 403 states that 
even relevant evidence may be excluded if the probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. Rule 404(a) 
further prohibits evidence tending to show the bad character 
of a criminal defendant, except in those situations where the 
defendant first offers evidence of his character. Furthermore, 
Rule 405(a) would not be applicable in this instance since the 
character or trait of character of the person is not an essential 
element of the charge. At best, the prior record of the 
defendant may be an element of the charge, however, the 
character trait or character as specified under Rule 405 is not 
an issue. When weighing the probative value of this witness 
against the danger of unfair prejudice, etc,., the Court must 
•Finn +hs+ tho ^rimi^inn of this evidence in this case is not 
proper. The avoidance of prejudice is particularly compelling 
where the Court had an alternate method in which to reasonably 
present the case to the jury while still preserving the defendant's 
rights under the Utah Rules of Evidence, The Defense counsel 
submitted a proposed stipulation which provided inter alia, that 
defendant would stipulate that if the jury were to find the 
killing knowing or intentional and not committed under the 
influence of extreme emotional distress, then the conviction 
would be for a capital homicide. The Court rejected this 
stipulation, not withstanding the obvious prejudicial effect, 
and allowed the State to provide evidence of the defendant's 
past criminal record. 
The Court should have dealt with this capital homicide 
trial similarly to the way it is instructed to deal with a 
habitual criminal trial under §76-8-101 and 102 Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended). Under that section, specifically 
Sub-Paragraph 3, the Court should have allowed the jury to 
make a decision as to whether to find the defendant guilty of 
murder or a lesser included offense of manslaughter. If the 
jury came back with a finding of guilt for murder, then Sub-
Section 8 of the capital homicide statute would take effect 
pursuant to the proposed stipulation and therefore the defendant 
would be found guilty of a capital murder and the jury could 
then make a decision concerning sentencing. 
POINT II 
THE STATE IS PROHIBITED FROM PRESENTING EVIDENCE CONCERNING 
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR RECORD BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 12 
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
The Constitutions of the United States and Utah provide 
that all criminal defendants have a right to a public trial by 
an impartial jury. This is further codified by the State of 
Utah in §76-1-501(1) which provides "a defendant in a criminal 
proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each element of the 
offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 
The purpose underlying these various provisions are obvious and 
language granting this right is absolute. In the present case, 
the elements whichconstitute an impartial jury and presumption 
of innocence were irreparably jeopardized by the Courts ruling 
which allowed the State in Its Case in Chief, to introduce 
evidence concerning the prior record of the defendant in this 
homicide tria1 . 
Indeed, the trial court in the present case expanded the 
admissibility of evidence concerning the defendant's prior 
record beyond the allowable parameter of any statute or 
constitution, even if it is assumed arguendo that there was 
no prejudicial effect in the admitting of the record itself. 
In the case at hand, the trial court broadened Rule 609 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence by allowing the State to introduce 
evidence of the defendant's commitment to the Utah State Prison 
on three prior occasions. 
The protections, afforded all criminal defendants by the 
Utah and United States Constitutions were irreparably violated 
by this testimony, and the State comments concerning William 
Florez' prior incarceration. The very fact that a criminal 
defendant has previously served time in prison, if brought 
out during trial, removes the presumption of innocence from 
that defendant. This removal of innocence occurs without 
any reference to the evidence of the case at trial, and denies 
the defendant of the fair trial guaranteed by the Constitution. 
The Utah Legislature has attempted to codify these 
constitutional rights in Utah Code Annotated §76-1-501(1), 
presumably due to the obvious importance of these rights. 
The violation of William Florez' statutory rights, by 
allowing reference to his prison commitments, is extremely 
prejudicial. The violation of this Defendant's constitutional 
privileges by this evidence warrants a reversal of his 
conviction. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR RECORD SHOULD NOT BE ADMITTED 
INTO EVIDENCE FOR PURPOSES OF IMPEACHMENT 
Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence outlines those 
instances in which a witness can be impeached by evidence of 
a prior conviction of a crime. Rule 609(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence provides that a witnesses' prior record can be 
introduced to impeach that witness, "only if the crimes, (1) 
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year 
under the law under which he was convicted and the Court 
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) 
involving dishonesty or false statement regardless of the 
punishment. (Rule 609(a) emphasis added). The relatively new 
adoption of the Utah Rules of Evidence (September 1, 1983) 
supercedes prior statutory provisions concerning the introduc-
tion of a witnesses' prior convictions for purposes of impeach-
ment. The Supreme Court of Utah has recently addressed this 
issue in the case of State of Utah v. Nicholas Banner, 717 P2d 
1325 (Utah 1986). That case presented the Court with a nearly 
identical situation as presently before this Court and is 
therefore controlling of the situation here. In the Banner 
decision, the Court was presented with a situation wherein a 
defendant was arrested and charged with sexual abuse of a 
child and sodomy upon a child. The defendant made a pre-
trial motion in which he sought to exclude evidence of prior 
felony convictions of assault with intent to commit rape. 
The Supreme Court, in its reversal of the trial court's 
decision which denied defendant's Motion to Exclude Evidence, 
defined the parameters under which a criminal defendant may 
be impeached by his prior record. The Court used a five prong 
test to be used in balancing the probative value against the 
prejudicial affect. 
1. The nature of the crime has bearing on the character 
or veracity of the witness. 
2. The recentness or remoteness of the prior conviction. 
3. The similarity of the prior crime to the charged 
crime insofar as a close resemblance may lead the 
jury to punish the accused as a bad person. 
4. The importance of the credibility issues in deter-
mining the truth in prosecution tried without 
decisive non-testimonial evidence. 
5. The importance of the accused's testimony as 
perhaps warranting the exclusions of the convic-
tions probative of the accused's character for 
veracity. (Id. at 1334) The Court went on to 
further state that, "it is universally held that 
the prosecution under Rule 609(a)(1) has the burden 
of persuading the Court that the probative value 
of admitting the convictions, as far as shedding 
light on the defendant's credibility outweighs 
the prejudicial effect to the defendant." (Id at 1334) 
An analysis of the facts of the present case, when 
scrutinized according to this five pronged test 
would establish that the probative value, if any, 
is far outweighed by the prejudicial effect the 
admission of defendant's prior crimes would have 
on the case. An analysis of the present case 
using the five points reveals exactly how pre-
judicial such admission is." 
1. The defendant's prior criminal record consists of 
several aggravated assaults. The very nature of an aggravated 
assault is one that does not have any bearing concerning the 
veracity of the witness. This is not a crime of moral 
turpitude as defined in numerous case law decisions. 
2. The prior convictions that the State admitted into 
evidence were a string of three aggravated assaults which 
occurred in 1977, 1980 and 1981. The most recent of those 
is over five years ago, thereby tilting the scale toward the 
remoteness side of the second prong of the tests. 
3. The three prior convictions are very similar to the 
charged crime in that they were all aggravated assaults and 
two of these aggravated assaults involved a stabbing, one 
occurred with the use of a knife. The close resemblance of 
the prior crimes definitely would lead the jury to punish the 
accused on his prior record rather than weighing the evidence 
soley on the occurences of Guly 28, 1986. 
4. The entirety of the evidence as relevant to this case 
is in the form of testimonial evidence and therefore prong 
number 4 would be inapplicable to the present case. 
5. The defendant's testimony is essential 10 a ueien^e 
in this case, in that other than Dana Montes, he is the only 
eye witness to the event. Furthermore, the defendant is the 
person that can best describe his state of mind at the time 
the offense occurred. This state of mind is the deciding 
factor between a manslaughter conviction or a capital homicide 
conviction. 
A close examination of the Banner case reveals that the 
Supreme Court applied this five prong test to a case very 
similar to the case at hand and found that the District Court 
erred in allowing the prior record of the defendant in before 
the jury. 
The Trial Court improperly relied on the case of State v. 
Shaffer, 725 P2d 1301 (Utah 1986), in its ruling to allow the 
State to introduce evidence of defendant's prior criminal acts. 
The Court in Shaffer held that the evidence of the defendant's 
prior crimes was admissible "If evidence of prior bad acts was 
material to any of these crimes." (Id at 1307). Unlike the 
present case the court in Shaffer was presented with a series 
of prior bad acts that were closely intertwined with the charged 
offenses. The prior acts occurred during or immediately 
previous to the defendant's association with the victim. The 
prior bad acts provided a motive for the alleged offenses and 
there was no stipulation offerred by the defense to facilitate 
the effective supresseion of these acts. 
The present case does not contain the close proximity of 
the prior acts to the charged offense. Here the last act 
occurred some five years before the stabbing. The prior 
aggravated assaults had no connection to the charged stabbing. 
M I C aiicyeu motive or tne charged offense was not affected 
by the prior bad acts, and finally the gravaman of the evidence 
of the three aggravated assaults goes only to prove a general 
disposition of the defendant to commit the offense. The Court 
in Shaffer noted "while evidence of other bad acts is inadmissible 
to show the general disposition of the defendant, such evidence, 
when relevant and competent, is admissible to prove a material 
fact." (Id at 1307) 
Clearly the State offered this evidence, particularly the 
evidence of the committment and the statements concerning 
Patricia Lavador, to show a propensity on the part of the 
defendant to commit the charged offense. The defense offered 
a viable and reasonable stipulation which would have accomplished 
the proof required under the Capital Homicide statute without 
the extreme prejudice to the defendant. In view of the severity 
of the charge,the high probabi1ity of prejudice,and the Supreme 
Court holding in State v. Banner, the trial court improperly 
allowed the evidence of defendant's prior bad acts, and such 
allowance constitutes reversable error. 
CONCLUSION 
Constitutional, statutory, and case law clearly establish 
that the defendant's prior convictions should not have been 
admitted in trial either in the State's Case in Chief or as 
evidence in an attempt to impeach the defendant. The Court 
had other means which could effectively have dealt with the 
statute as written, but which would also have preserved 
defendant's rights as described in the points above. The 
evidence, therefore was improperly admitted, the defendant, 
13 
was extremely prejudiced and the defendant respectfully asks 
this Court to reverse the conviction and grant the defendant 
a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of Oune, 1987. 
DEIRDRE A. GORMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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